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Cloud-Trust - a Security Assessment Model 
for Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Clouds  
Dan Gonzales, Member, IEEE, Jeremy Kaplan, Evan Saltzman, Zev Winkelman, Dulani Woods 
Abstract— The vulnerability of Cloud Computing Systems (CCSs) to Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) is a significant 
concern to government and industry. We present a cloud architecture reference model that incorporates a wide range of 
security controls and best practices, and a cloud security assessment model – Cloud-Trust – that estimates high level security 
metrics to quantify the degree of confidentiality and integrity offered by a CCS or cloud service provider (CSP). Cloud-Trust is 
used to assess the security level of four multi-tenant IaaS cloud architectures equipped with alternative cloud security controls 
and to show the probability of CCS penetration (high value data compromise) is high if a minimal set of security controls are 
implemented. CCS penetration probability drops substantially if a cloud defense in depth security architecture is adopted that 
protects virtual machine (VM) images at rest, strengthens CSP and cloud tenant system administrator access controls, and 
which employs other network security controls to minimize cloud network surveillance and discovery of live VMs. 
Index Terms— Cloud computing, cyber security, advanced persistent threats, security metrics, virtual machine (VM) isolation 
 
——————————   u   —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The flexibility and scalability of CCSs can offer signifi-
cant benefits to government and private industry [1][2]. 
However, it can be difficult to transition legacy software 
to the cloud [3]. Concerns have also been raised as to 
whether cloud users can trust CSPs to protect cloud ten-
ant data and whether CCSs can prevent the unauthorized 
disclosure of sensitive or private information. The litera-
ture is rife with studies of CCS security vulnerabilities 
that can be exploited by APTs [4] [5][6][7].  
     Virtualization, the basis for most CCSs, enables CSPs 
to start, stop, move, and restart computing workloads on 
demand. VMs run on computing hardware that may be 
shared by cloud tenants. This enables flexibility and elas-
ticity, but introduces security concerns. The security sta-
tus of a CCS depends on many factors, including security 
applications running on the system, the hypervisor (HV) 
and associated protection measures, the design patterns 
used to isolate the control plane from cloud tenants, the 
level of protection provided by the CSP to cloud tenant 
user data and VM images, as well as other factors.  
    These concerns raise questions. Can the overall securi-
ty status of a CCS or a CSP offering be assessed using a 
framework that addresses the unique vulnerabilities of 
CCSs and can such assessments be applied to alternative 
CCS architectures and CSP offerings in an unbiased way?  
The federal government has issued security controls that 
CSPs must implement to obtain FEDRAMP CCS security 
certification [8] that are based on National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) cloud security guide-
lines [1]. However, these do not provide high-level deci-
sion-makers with an overall assessment of CCS security 
status or the degree of confidentiality and integrity of-
fered by specific cloud architectures [9].  
The main contributions of this paper are to develop a 
CCS reference architecture and a cloud security assess-
ment model – Cloud-Trust – that provides quantitative 
high level security assessments of IaaS CCSs and CSPs. 
Cloud-Trust can assess the relative level of security of-
fered by alternative CSPs or cloud architectures. Cloud 
tenants can use it to make decisions on which CSP securi-
ty options or cloud security features to implement. We 
illustrate the use of Cloud-Trust by applying it to the case 
where the cloud tenant is a U.S. government agency and 
examine how well four alternative CCS architectures pro-
tect U.S. government data.  
Cloud-Trust is based on CCS unique attack paths that 
cover the essential elements of an IaaS cloud architecture. 
It is based on a Bayesian network model of the CCS, the 
class of APT attack paths spanning the CCS attack space, 
and the APT attack steps required to implement each 
attack path. It provides two key high-level security met-
rics to summarize CCS security status quantitatively: 
• Probability an APT can access high value data  
• Probability the APT is detected by cloud tenant or 
CCS security monitoring systems 
    The first security metric estimates whether high value 
data (designated as “Gold” data in this paper) is likely to 
be compromised or erased from the CCS. The second 
metric assesses whether the CSP provides cloud tenants 
sufficient CCS network monitoring, file access, and situa-
tion awareness data to detect intrusions into a tenant’s 
cloud network, and whether the tenant’s security and 
monitoring systems contribute to the intrusion detection.   
   This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
trust zones. Section 3 presents a cloud reference model 
and cloud security control features. Section 4 describes 
CCS unique attack paths and vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited by APTs. Section 5 describes Cloud-Trust. The 
final section provides Cloud-Trust results for four alter-
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native cloud architectures, and describes how Cloud-
Trust can be used to assess the security capabilities of 
alternative CSP offerings. 
2 PHYSICAL AND VIRTUAL TRUST ZONES 
   We define a trust zone (TZ) as a combination of net-
work segmentation and identity and access management 
(IAM) controls. These define physical, logical, or virtual 
boundaries around network resources. Cloud TZs can be 
implemented using physical devices, virtually using vir-
tual firewall and switching applications, or using both 
physical and virtual appliances.  
   IAM systems use usernames, passwords, and access 
control lists (ACLs), and may use Active Directory Do-
main Controllers [10], Federated Trusts [11], and multi-
factor authentication mechanisms using time limited 
codes or X.509 certificates. IAM servers can also use 
hardware information to make access decisions. For ex-
ample, devices without a pre-validated MAC address can 
be prevented from joining a network. Routers using 
ACLs and IP address white listing can prevent an unau-
thorized device from accessing network resources. These 
are examples of hardware based TZ enforcement. 
 
Fig. 1.  CCS Network Segmentation Scheme 
An example of a more complex network CCS segmenta-
tion scheme is shown in Fig. 1. It uses defense in depth ap-
proach to restrict network connectivity to VMs running in a 
CCS. Both real and virtual Network Interface Cards (NICs) 
are used to isolate network segments. The network segmen-
tation approach is based on the virtual networking capabili-
ties offered by VMware in their ESX HV [12]. It enables a 
hybrid strategy that uses both virtual network and physical 
firewall barriers to protect information in TZs A and B 
shown in the Fig. 1. Amazon Web Services (AWS) offers a 
similar capability called Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) [13]. 
An APT attack with the goal of exfiltrating data at rest on a 
resource in TZ B in Fig. 1 must first circumvent the net-
work segmentation and establish network access to the tar-
get resource. By staging the attack from a trusted IP address 
(whitelisted by the firewall(s) protecting that zone), the at-
tacker may gain network connectivity to the target. Assum-
ing the data at rest is encrypted and brute force decryption 
is not feasible, the attacker must also gain access to the 
credentials and keys required to decipher the data. This 
access is typically governed by policies and accounts on 
the domain controller. Access is granted for legitimate 
requests from users that have been authenticated and 
who are authorized. Successfully spoofing these requests, 
or otherwise gaining access to the keys after access has 
been granted to a legitimate user, would provide the at-
tacker with the ability to decrypt the data. 
Compromising data from TZ B in Fig. 1 while it is in 
flight presents different challenges. Data in flight may 
transit other segments of the network with lower barriers 
to access for the attacker.  For example, if a server in TZ 
A retrieves data from TZ B, the data is now in this less 
protected zone, and may be diverted or copied and 
transmitted over the Internet. If the data is in flight using 
a protocol that does not guarantee end-to-end encryption 
such as SOAP, and instead uses point-to-point transport 
level encryption such as REST over HTTPS, the data will 
be decrypted at various points in transit, possibly in 
memory, before it reaches the application layer at the 
destination endpoint. On the other hand, relying on cap-
turing data in flight makes it much more difficult to 
compromise the entire dataset.  
  The security of TZ implementations depend on correctly 
configuring domain controllers, firewalls, routers, and 
switches that are used in segmenting and restricting ac-
cess to portions of the cloud network and on “locking 
down” secure communications between users and do-
main controllers to prevent SOAP interface or signature 
wrapping attacks [14]. Misconfiguration of IAM servers, 
domain controllers and other network devices can intro-
duce vulnerabilities in the cloud network and let attack-
ers enter restricted TZs. Careful configuration manage-
ment is a key factor that must be taken into account in 
assessing cloud security status. To ensure such vulnera-
bilities are not inadvertently created in a CCS well 
trained system administrators (sys-admins) are needed to 
set up, maintain, and correctly patch this infrastructure. 
3  CCS REFERENCE MODEL AND ARCHITECTURES 
This work is limited to one cloud deployment model, 
infrastructure as a service (IaaS) clouds. The layers of the 
software stack below the Guest OS are under the control 
of the IaaS CSP: the virtual machine manager (VMM), 
HV, computing and storage hardware, and the CCS net-
work. Only the guest OS that forms the foundation for 
VMs is assumed under the control of cloud tenants. IaaS 
cloud tenants provide their own applications and data. 
The Guest OS may be specified by the CSP policy, or con-
trol of the guest OS configuration may be shared between 
the CSP and cloud tenant. Because of the shared control 
of the IaaS cloud software stack the security profile and 
status of the CCS depends on both CSP and tenants. 
   The CCS reference model is shown in Fig. 2. CSP man-
agement and security servers are segregated from cloud 
tenant VMs by subnets, firewalls, domain controllers, 
and internet access points. Tenant VMs are networked 
using a software defined network (SDN) shared by all 
cloud tenants. A CSP domain controller controls access to 
virtual TZs used by cloud tenants. TZ gold, which con-
tains more valuable Agency data, is housed within 
Agency TZ A. This provides multiple access control 
boundaries to prevent external cloud users, for example 
from the tenant B TZ, from accessing data in the Gold TZ.   
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Fig. 2: CCS Reference Model 
The CSP TZ is segregated from tenant TZs and contains 
cloud management servers, SDN controller servers, CSP 
tenant IAM servers, and CSP Information System Security 
System (IS3) servers. CSP sys-admins communicate with 
CSP management systems through a separate firewall and 
Internet port to isolate CSP communications traffic. It is a 
best practice to isolate CSP management and monitoring 
systems from cloud tenant VMs, as illustrated in Fig. 2 [15]. 
Our cloud reference model is based on this best practice and 
design tenets developed by the Defense Information Sys-
tems Agency (DISA) for securing enterprise networks [16]. 
Early information systems were designed largely to man-
age computing resources, apportion costs, and improve per-
formance. As cyber threats grew, enterprise network securi-
ty capabilities grew in an attempt to keep pace with the 
threat. Modern firewalls block IP ports and protocols and 
inspect packets. They also include host-based Intrusion De-
tection Systems (IDSs), keystroke logging, reverse web 
proxy servers, DMZs, IAM servers, security incident event 
managers (SIEMs), and other more exotic detection and 
protection systems. Network performance monitoring tools, 
such as Netflow, and log file analyzers are used to identify 
suspect data flows or configuration changes, and automated 
software distribution systems rapidly patch OS installations 
and applications. Cyber security systems have been adapted 
so they perform similar functions in CCSs, although virtual-
ization presents new challenges to both the attacker and 
defender. 
We call the cloud systems that detect and prevent the ac-
tions of malware and bad actors the Information System 
Security System (IS3). IS3 systems can generate lots of data 
and have high false alarm rates. Well-trained sys-admin 
personnel are needed to monitor and manage IS3 servers. A 
cloud IS3 includes IDSs, host based security systems, fire 
-walls, IAM servers, reverse proxy web servers, syslog 
servers, and SIEM servers (all capable of functioning effec-
tively in a virtual environment). The SIEM aggregates event 
data produced by security devices, network infrastructures, 
systems and applications. Event data is combined with con-
textual information about users, assets, threats and vulnera-
bilities. The data is normalized, so events, data and contex-
tual information from disparate sources can be correlated 
and analyzed for specific purposes, such as network security 
event monitoring, user activity monitoring and compliance 
reporting. Fig. 2 shows the location of IS3 servers used by 
the CSP, the Agency, and other tenants. We assume tenants 
provide their own IS3s to monitor and manage their TZs.  
System protection and risk reduction involve numerous 
actions not performed directly on the CCS. These include 
physical protection measures, vetting employees, security 
awareness training, maintaining a vulnerability management 
data base, and participating in national vulnerability organi-
zations and fora (e.g., SANS). We do not include employee 
training or vetting activities in Cloud-Trust, but note they 
are important for securing CCSs and CSPs.  
A wide range of options exist for configuring, segment-
ing, and applying security controls to a CCS. Many types of 
security systems can be added. It is the beyond the scope of 
this paper to enumerate all possible cloud security controls. 
We focus on a few new promising CCS specific security 
capabilities. An important security attribute is how CSP sys-
admins manage the CCS. We assume management is per-
formed off-site. As described above we assume CSP sys-
admins control CSP management servers using a dedicated 
Internet portal. CSP sys-admin traffic is accepted by the 
CSP control port firewall and routed to CSP management 
servers only if the traffic originates from an approved list of 
IP addresses. CSP management applications are isolated by 
hosting them on dedicated servers in their own CCS subnet. 
However, they cannot be completely isolated from tenant 
VMs, as they must monitor tenant VMs. Fig. 2 shows rout-
ers connecting tenant and CSP management subnets. These 
subnets can be isolated in hardware by using separate NICs 
for public and control plane (i.e., management) networking. 
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TABLE 1 
CCS Architecture Security Controls 
 
 VM Images 
At Rest 
VM Migra-
tion  
CSP Sys-
admin 
IAM 
Data Center physical 
security 
Hypervisor, 
BIOS, CPU  
VM Isola-
tion 
Tenant 
IAM 
App. 
White-
listing 
Cloud 
Arch 1 
Not encrypt-
ed  
Unencrypted 
memory 
pages and 
packets 
Single 
factor  
All CSP employees 
have access  
HV, BIOS not 
signed 
CPU without 
TPM 
No net-
work, CPU 
isolation 
Single 
factor  
No 
Cloud 
Arch 2 
Not encrypt-
ed  
Unencrypted 
memory 
pages and 
packets 
2 factor – 
time lim-
ited token 
code 
CSP employee access 
limited & controlled 
+ USB server ports 
disabled 
HV, BIOS not 
signed 
CPU without 
TPM  
No net-
work, CPU 
isolation 
Single 
factor 
No 
Cloud  
Arch 3 
Not encrypt-
ed  
Unencrypted 
memory 
pages and 
packets 
2 factor – 
time lim-
ited token 
code 
CSP employee access 
limited & controlled+ 
USB server ports 
disabled 
HV, BIOS not 
signed 
CPU without 
TPM 
No net-
work, CPU 
isolation 
2 factor – 
time 
limited 
token 
No 
Cloud  
Arch 4 
Encrypted at 
rest + file 
access moni-
toring 
Encrypted 
memory 
pages and 
packets 
2 factor – 
time lim-
ited token 
code 
CSP employee access 
limited & controlled+ 
USB server ports 
disabled 
Signed HV, 
signed BIOS 
CPU with 
TPM 
Virtual 
PANs, 
temporal 
CPU isola-
tion 
2 factor – 
time 
limited 
token 
Yes 
Table 1 shows four cloud architectures based on the 
reference model with progressively more security con-
trols. More robust security controls are shaded. All four 
architectures use an SDN for tenant VM networking. 
The first has a minimal set of security controls. The 
second incorporates additional data center physical ac-
cess, CSP sys-admin authentication, and server hardware 
port controls. In the first architecture any CSP employee 
can enter the cloud data center. In the second, CSP sys-
admins are not permitted in the data center. Employees 
authorized to enter the data center carry electronic access 
control cards and their movements are tracked in the 
data center. CSP sys-admins must use two factor authen-
tication to login to CSP management servers, and they 
must sign in as named local users and not as root. Some 
cloud management products now offer such capabilities 
[17], which make it easier to identify unauthorized pro-
cesses running with high privilege levels.  
The third architecture includes the security controls of 
the second one and applies these security controls to all 
Agency sys-admin and regular users. Agency cloud users 
must login to Agency VMs using time sensitive two fac-
tor authentication methods.  
The fourth architecture includes additional cloud in-
frastructure hardening measures. VM images are en-
crypted in storage. VM image store directories are moni-
tored for access attempts, image changes, and TZs are 
isolated using more robust measures.  
The HV and (Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) used 
in the CCS present potential additional points of vulner-
ability. HVs contain source code also found in an OS and 
may have large code bases, which means they may con-
tain significant vulnerabilities. New technologies have 
have been developed to protect HVs and BIOS and to 
detect unauthorized HV or BIOS tampering. NIST has 
developed guidance for hardening BIOS [18]. Server 
vendors and microprocessor manufacturers now provide 
capabilities to verify CPU authenticity, the unaltered 
state of key chips on the motherboard, and which can 
securely measure and store BIOS and software boot time 
information. These make use of the Trusted Platform 
module (TPM) [19]. TPM has been integrated with the 
boot time measurement and remote attestation capabili-
ties of Intel and other microprocessors [20]. There are 
many options to consider in this area. A particular CSP 
may implement a commercial HV that utilizes all of the 
security capabilities offered by TPM. Or the CSP may 
choose to not implement any of the security options 
available for a particular HV, microprocessor, or server. 
Or the CSP may use a custom designed HV, with its own 
unique security features. In this case the complete set of 
HV and server security features may not be public in-
formation. For the sake of illustration we consider only 
two options in this area. In cloud architectures 1 to 3 we 
assume a non-signed HV and servers and CPUs without 
TPM are used. In these cloud architectures, the integrity 
of the BIOS and HV cannot be verified during boot up.  
Cloud architecture 4 is more secure. All servers in the 
CCS are assumed to use trusted BIOS (signed BIOS), 
TPM, and CPUs capable of making secure boot time 
measurements, such as Intel Trusted Execution Technol-
ogy equipped CPUs [20]. Some HVs, such as VMware’s 
vSphere 5.1 and later, are available in modular form, 
with each module containing a PKI signature that can be 
independently used to verify boot time and the unmodi-
fied state of the software code base during boot up. In the 
future, protected memory CPUs may have TPM capabili-
ties built into the microprocessor, and may be used to 
verify the unmodified state of the HV code base dynami-
cally at periodic stages at runtime [21] [22].  
Table 1 shows other security attributes of the CCS ar-
chitectures we consider. One is the degree of isolation of 
tenant TZs. An important aspect of this isolation is 
whether cloud users in other TZs can surveil the public 
portions or private tenant subnets in the cloud beyond 
their own subnet or TZ.  If tenant VM names and IP ad-
dresses are readily available within the cloud, a cloud 
user from outside the Agency may be able to use stand-
ard network surveillance tools to identify the names and 
IP addresses of VMs used by Agency users (as may be 
possible in the Amazon Web Services cloud if certain 
security controls are not implemented by the tenant [5]). 
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These capabilities have significant security implications, 
as shown by Ristenpart [5]. A wide range of network 
configurations is relevant to this security dimension. To 
make the analysis tractable we consider only two options 
in this area. The first is when cloud tenants have a wide 
range of surveillance capabilities at their disposal. The 
second is when the cloud tenant is not able to conduct 
surveillance operations across tenant TZs. The second 
option is adopted only in the fourth cloud architecture. It 
can be implemented in a variety of ways. One is by using 
dedicated hardware, perimeter firewalls, and IDSs to 
protect the Agency TZs, as is the best practice for secur-
ing enterprise networks [16]. However, this reduces 
cloud flexibility and elasticity. New cloud security tech-
nologies, like virtual firewalls and virtual networking 
using encrypted packets provide similar capabilities in a 
fully virtualized environment. AWS offers a EC2 service 
called Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) with these capabilities 
[13]. VMware offers networking and security capabilities 
in a product called VxLan [23] to support the isolation of 
VMs and VM TZs, and has recently received a patent on 
such capabilities [24].   
VMs in storage and migration also require protection 
[25] [26]. If the VM image is altered in storage and com-
promised by malware, an adversary may gain control of 
the VM even if it is spun up in a highly protected TZ. If 
an adversary can gain access to a VM when it is stored in 
memory during migration or to the VM packet stream 
when the VM is moved, the adversary can obtain crypto 
keys or other credentials that provide access to sensitive 
data and applications in the agency TZ [27]. VM images 
can be encrypted to prevent VM image inspection and 
compromise. Live VMs could also be protected during 
migration by encrypting them in memory and during 
their movement by encrypting VM IP packets. These se-
curity controls are part of the fourth cloud architecture, 
as indicated in Table 1. 
4 CCS NODE CLASSES 
The abstracted view of an IaaS CCS is shown in Fig. 
3. It is the starting point for Cloud-Trust, and is based on 
the types of nodes in a CCS. These are labeled node clas-
ses, because many individual nodes of each type or class 
will be present in the CCS.  
To simplify the analysis we assume all nodes in each 
node class are identical in terms of their security proper-
ties (before any malware is introduced we assume they 
are identically configured and that if there are system or 
node configuration errors these are common across all 
nodes in a node class). Therefore, it is not essential to 
distinguish between individual elements in each node 
class, and we can define a Bayesian network model in 
which the nodes of the network are CCS node classes, 
and not individual system components of the CCS. This 
Bayesian network model forms the basis of Cloud-Trust.  
The columns in Fig. 3 indicate the TZs node classes 
belong to. The types of nodes classes are indicated in the 
first column. Node classes reflect the segregation of CSP 
and tenant network paths. The CCS architecture shown 
in Fig. 3 also has the feature that VM traffic within a TZ 
can be confined in that zone and segregated if all intra-
TZ message traffic is routed by the V routers. This func-
tionality is consistent with SDN or virtual networking 
capabilities provided by leading HV vendors and CSPs.  
 
Fig. 3: CCS Node Classes 
The attacker’s objective is assumed to be the data 
store in TZ Gold in the upper left hand corner of Fig. 3. 
The APT will have to traverse the network of node class 
objects from bottom to top to gain such access if the at-
tack starts from outside the cloud.  
Using such node class diagrams, a cyber attack 
against an IaaS cloud can be represented by a directed 
graph of edges and nodes. The types node classes includ-
ed in the node class diagram depend on the specifics of 
the cloud architecture examined. To find the set of edges 
that represent technically feasible cyber attacks we inves-
tigate specific CCS vulnerabilities identified in the litera-
ture. These are used to develop a set of attack paths that 
span the set of all feasible paths through the CCS infra-
structure to the APT target. 
5 CCS ATTACK PATHS 
CCS attacks can be divided into outsider or insider at-
tacks. Outsiders can gain access to the cloud using three 
attack paths. The first exploits weaknesses in cloud ac-
cess control mechanisms. Such weaknesses may exist in 
firewalls or IAM servers used by the CSP or cloud ten-
ants. The second starts by stealing valid credentials of a 
cloud user at some location outside the cloud (for exam-
ple from a host inside a government agency). The third 
outsider attack path starts with the attacker using valid 
credentials and prior legitimate access to the cloud.  
Insider attack paths start inside the cloud when the at-
tacker already exploits credentials for at least one cloud 
TZ, for example the CSP TZ. The ingress attack paths we 
consider are shown in Table 2.  
The attack paths are defined in two variants. The first 
we call a “Stuxnet” variant where the APT requires little 
or no command and control (C2) by the external human 
attacker. In this case the APT has the surveillance infor-
mation it needs to conduct all stages of the attack, or ca-
pabilities needed to independently do surveillance. The 
second attack variant is one where the APT has much 
less capability and information about the CCS environ-
ment. In this case we assume it must communicate with 
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an external control authority and be updated with new 
capabilities during the attack. 
Table 2 
Cloud Specific Attack Ingress Paths 
 
The target data that the APT attempts to access in all 
these attacks is located in a cloud TZ controlled by a gov-
ernment Agency –TZ Gold (G). We assume Agency users 
with TZ G access are also able to log into VMs in the 
Agency’s TZ A. We do not assume that Agency network 
traffic is not restricted between A and G TZs. We also 
assume that Agency VMs operating in the same TZ run 
on the same physical machines and HVs. 
VM CPU Timing Side Channel Attack 
This attack is based on VM vulnerabilities identified by 
Ristenpart, et. al. [5]. It is representative of a class of at-
tacks that take advantage of VM co-residency, which 
arises when VMs of two or more users share the same 
hardware. If the attacker’s VM is co-resident with the 
target VM it may be able to glean information from the 
target VM by observing the hardware's behavior.   
First the APT obtains access to the cloud and conducts 
surveillance. If the target is in a public cloud the only 
barrier to entry is a valid credit card to establish an ac-
count. The attacker instantiates VMs as needed to collect 
information on servers and VMs.  To surveill the cloud 
the attacker will run legitimate code or malware.  
We define VMs as being co-resident when they operate 
within the same physical machine and same HV. A varie-
ty of techniques can be used to detect and establish co-
residency [5].  
If the tenant is not guaranteed exclusive use of hard-
ware, the instantiation of a VM that is co-resident with a 
target VM is generally governed by chance. However, it 
may still be possible using techniques described by Ris-
tenpart [5] called “Cloud Cartography.” Other co-
residency checks use network trace routes. Since the first 
network “hop” from a VM is its HV, if that HV is config-
ured to report itself when a trace route is conducted, co-
residency can be detected using IP addresses. In a similar 
way, “distance” can be determined by ping packet round 
trip times.  The lower the round trip time, the more likely 
the VMs are co-resident [5].  
If the VM operates an external facing service such as a 
website, still other load analysis techniques may be feasi-
ble estimate co-residency [5]. 
Once co-residency is achieved, the attacker uses a 
prime-trigger-probe technique to monitor activity on the 
shared CPU's cache. The attacker's goal is to obtain an 
agency user's password, which may be done by analyz-
ing an agency user's inter-keystroke timings [5] [29].  
Once credentials have obtained, they are used to di-
rectly logon to the target’s VMs. Once inside the agency 
network, additional surveillance may be conducted to 
identify and gain access to the targeted Gold data.  
Software Defined Networking Attack 
This attack exploits potential vulnerabilities in SDNs [30]. 
Virtual switches are special purpose VMs that may be co-
resident with guest VMs on the same HV. Other configu-
rations are possible including one where the virtual 
switch logic and code are integrated with the HV.  
First, the APT gains access to VMs in a cloud TZ (e.g., 
TZ B) that are logical and network “peers” to the target 
VMs. This can be done through legitimate means if the 
only barrier to obtaining a CSP account is payment.  
With legitimate or stolen credentials, the APT gains 
regular user access to a TZ B VM. The APT installs mal-
ware on the TZ B VM, which enables the APT to control 
the HV (exploiting a HV vulnerability).1 Once the HV has 
been compromised, the APT is able collect information 
from the host machine’s RAM such as additional creden-
tials, network architecture, and decryption keys to com-
promise additional VMs and physical machines as neces-
sary.  We assume that credentials obtained for one VM in 
a TZ can be used on other VMs in the same TZ.  
The APT obtains credentials to logon to a VM on the 
machine hosting the VM with access to Gold data. The 
APT compromises the HV on this machine. This time, the 
APT uses malware to modify the behavior of the virtual 
switch.  This could include changes to the code in the 
virtual switch, the routing table, or both, so network 
packets destined for or emanating from the target (gold 
TZ) VM are copied and directed to a VM under APT con-
trol. Encryption of network traffic within the agency’s 
virtual enclave could deter such an attack. 
The APT obtains the targeted information over time by 
filtering the inbound and outbound network traffic to the 
target VM. The CSP design pattern that makes this attack 
possible is putting SDN based VMs co-resident in the 
same physical machines with cloud tenant VMs.  
VM Attack Through the HV  
This attack starts in much the same way as the SDN at-
tack above.  The APT obtains valid government user cre-
dentials (through spearfishing, surveillance, or use of 
malware) that can be used to access a VM operating in 
the agency’s TZ in the cloud. A related attack path exists 
in the public cloud. Then the attacker obtains a public 
cloud account and initiates VMs in TZ B with the objec-
tive of compromising the HV and obtaining co-residency 
with a target agency VM running in TZ A or TZ G. 
HV compromise proceeds as in the SDN attack. The 
APT installs malware that exploits a vulnerability in the 
HV that enables privilege level escalation [31] [32]. Once 
the HV is compromised, the APT collects data from the 
host machine’s RAM such as additional credentials, net-
work architecture, and decryption keys to compromise  
 
 Attack Name Key Node Classes Exploited 
1 VM side channel attack Physical machine 
2 SDN virtual router Hypervisor, virtual router 
3 VM attack through the hypervisor Hypervisor 
4 Live VM attack VM 
5 Corrupting VM images 1 VM image and VMs 
6 Disk injection to Live VM VM 
7 VM migration attack 1 Local storage 
8 VM migration attack 2 V-router 
9 VMM control compromise 1  VMM, V-router 
10 VMM control compromise 2  VMM, hypervisor 
11 CSP sys admin + physical access Physical machine, VM 
12 Corrupting VM images 2 VMs and VM images 
13 Undetected configuration modification CSP firewalls and IAM servers 
14 Nested Virtualization Hypervisor 
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additional VMs and physical machines as necessary. This 
data is used to locate target VMs and to obtain co-
residency.  
Once the attacker has successfully executed the above 
steps and becomes co-resident with the target VM, the 
APT can extract relevant data from the memory of an 
operating VM in the Gold TZ and can gain access to Gold 
data. 
Live VM Attack 
In this attack we assume each VM has at least one “local” 
active administrator account. For this is a local username-
password account the VM doesn’t seek network valida-
tion of the logon. The hashed user name and password - 
that is targeted by the APT.   
We also assume all VMs in agency TZ have the same 
local sys-admin logon accounts. The success of this attack 
and variations on it are dependent primarily on the 
agency’s configuration of its VMs.     
First, the attacker illicitly obtains agency credentials 
from outside the cloud to gain regular user access to a 
VM in the Agency’s TZ A. With these credentials, the 
APT gains regular user access to an agency VM in TZ A. 
Depending on the tenant’s security configuration, the 
APT may need to work around additional hurdles such 
as access via a restricted range of IP addresses (i.e., IP 
white listing restrictions). We assume for this attack that 
these additional security controls are not in place.  
The APT installs malware to extract the file containing 
the hashed local sys-admin password (such malware 
would require some form of malicious privilege escala-
tion). The APT moves the hashed password file to a loca-
tion under its control where it decrypts the password file. 
Using this local sys-admin password, the APT logs into 
additional TZ A VMs and installs a key logger to collect 
additional credentials. The APT repeats this combination 
of local sys-admin password and key logger exploits un-
til eventually, the APT obtains credentials sufficient to 
gain access to a VM running in the Gold TZ that has ac-
cess to gold data. 
Corrupting VM Images 1 
In this attack VM images are compromised and used to 
gain access to agency Gold data [33]. We assume agency 
reference VM images are stored in the cloud. The success 
of this attack is dependent on the VM image storage con-
trols used by the CSP and agency. For this attack to be 
effective VM images images would not be encrypted, no 
file access monitoring used, and only single factor au-
thentication would be available to tenants.   
First, the attacker uses valid (insider) or stolen (outsid-
er) credentials to access the agency’s image store in CCS. 
These credentials are assumed to grant the intruder ac-
cess to TZ A and to a shared storage directory accessible 
by the CSP and agency users with TZ A access creden-
tials. Agency VM images are stored in this shared storage 
directory.  The outside attacker uses stolen credentials to 
access and copy one or more agency VM images. The 
insider would be a CSP sys admin or an Agency sys ad-
min who has access to the shared VM image store.  
The attacker modifies the VM image to include mal-
ware that monitors data accessed by VM. The attacker 
uses the same agency credentials to insert the modified 
VM image into the image store. Agency personnel use 
the infected VM image to instantiate new VMs. The mal-
ware on infected images remains dormant for a period of 
time to avoid triggering startup timing alarms. 
Malware on the VM monitors the data accessed by the 
VM user. When the Gold data is accessed, the APT uses 
additional exploits on the target VM to access Gold data. 
This may involve caching credentials to allow the APT to 
directly access the VM or to deposit Gold data in local 
storage using previously stolen credentials. 
Disk Injection to Live VM 
The attacker attempts to gain access to agency Gold data 
by placing malicious code in the local attached storage of 
the targeted VM [34]. Necessary pre-conditions for this 
attack are that the VM in TZ Gold is operating on a phys-
ical machine that hosts VMs in other TZs, and the attack-
er can conduct network surveillance inside the cloud. 
The APT can then attempt co-residency with the target.  
Using similar surveillance, pivoting, and compromise 
steps associated with earlier attacks, the APT gains access 
to a VM that is co-resident with a target VM operated by 
the Agency in its gold TZ. 
In this attack, after the APT logons to a VM co-resident 
with the target VM, the APT exploits a vulnerability in 
the HV to compromise it. 
Using the compromised HV, the APT writes malicious 
code to the local storage of the target VM. The HV also 
makes a minor change to the native “root/admin” level 
job scheduling system of the OS that ensures the mali-
cious code will be called. When the privileged 
(root/admin level) job is called on the target VM, the 
malicious code is loaded and run. The malware then bea-
cons its readiness to take further action by communi-
cating to the APT’s human controller. The APT is di-
rected by the attacker to access Agency Gold data.  
This attack becomes much more difficult if the local 
storage of the VM is encrypted.  In such case, both the 
encryption regime and the HV must be compromised in 
order to complete the attack. 
VM Migration Attack 
VMs are migrated or moved frequently in clouds to pre-
vent the overheating of servers and to optimally allocate 
workloads to available physical machines and resources. 
During workload migration VM memory pages includ-
ing the OS are copied and moved to a new location. This 
attack takes advantage of the exposure of a VM during 
VM migration operations in the cloud [27]. 
Through spearfishing and surveillance, the APT ob-
tains user credentials for a VM operating in cloud tenant 
B TZ. 
Using a VM in TZ B the APT monitors network traffic 
(without additional compromises, this presumes that the 
VM is receiving and can control the behavior of its virtu-
al or physical NIC to put it into promiscuous mode so 
that it can capture packets not addressed to it). APT uses 
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VMs in TZ B to capture and filter network traffic. 
When a live VM transfer is detected, the attacker’s VM 
stores the associated packets. Useful information is ex-
tracted from the captured VM (certificates, credentials, 
file access information) and is used to compromise addi-
tional VMs in other TZs, until the attacker compromises a 
VM in TZ Gold. At this point the attacker gains access to 
Agency Gold data. 
CSP personnel with physical access 
CSP personnel with physical access to the CSP datacenter 
can breach security controls by direct access to physical 
machines. However, the large number of machines com-
plicates the task. Precision requires the attacker first iden-
tify the hardware hosting the target data.  
The CSP insider cannot make physical contact with 
every machine in the datacenter, but he has several 
methods to locate the machine hosting the agency TZ G 
VMs. The first is to enumerate all of the Agency’s live 
VMs. CSP management servers hold such data. A CSP 
sys-admin will have access to this data.  
The list of agency VMs might be very large. The attack-
er must reduce the list so he can visit each machine. In-
formation that can help narrow the list is configuration 
data. This includes security group and other tenant creat-
ed configurations that reveal the topology of the tenants 
resources in the cloud, specific services that can be as-
sumed based on specific ports that are open, identity and 
access management data that shows which tenant users 
have CSP accounts and what they are allowed to do with 
specific resources, tenant naming conventions for their 
machine images or instances, and relative memory, disk, 
CPU, and I/O sizing of various instances. These steps are 
likely to identify, for example, large machines, which 
host web server, file share, or database processes, and 
those that have limited access.  
Once the CSP insider knows which machines to visit, 
he must map these to the datacenter layout. Datacenters 
that are segmented or compartmentalized, or keep access 
to physical and logical maps separate, will complicate the 
task. In contrast, datacenters that have a single point of 
entry will make this attack easier. 
A CSP insider can inject malware using a USB drive. 
USB ports on physical machines are a well-known vector 
for inserting malware and ex-filtrating data. These at-
tacks can be instrumented to work in an environment 
where the user is unprivileged and possibly unaware of 
the payload.  
To compromise the target the attacker must induce it to 
load the malware. Physical machines with protections 
against ‘autorun’ execution may require additional ma-
nipulation via a KVM management interface. Such access 
may require access tokens that would identify the insid-
er, but this depends on how such tokens, including local 
machine administrator account passwords, are managed. 
Given the familiarity a CSP insider is likely to have with 
the software, hardware, and virtualization stack, they 
may have the option of employing minimally invasive, 
and therefore hard to detect malware such as an in 
memory rootkit. Such malware will not be directly de-
tected by disk or network based scans. 
The malware injected via physical access provides a 
breach point for the attacker. The breach itself can pro-
vide network access and elevated privileges on the HV 
hosting the target VM. By beaconing to known attacker 
control nodes, the attacker can establish a link to control 
the execution of the rest of the attack. 
VM Manager (VMM) Control Compromise 
CSP sys-admins use VMM capabilities to migrate live 
VMs, to allow for hardware servicing without execution 
interruption, or to debug faults using core dumps and 
memory page snapshots. An attacker can repurpose 
VMM utilities to compromise agency data. 
VMMs can be a privileged VM that runs on top of the 
HV. The VMM has access to ring 0 privileges and can see 
other VM’s memory and configuration values. If the at-
tacker gains direct access to the VMM, or is able to cor-
rupt the VMM control channel, they would gain a great 
deal of maneuverability within cloud infrastructure. 
Compromising the VMM or VMM control provides the 
attacker with a path to Agency Gold data by making keys 
and other sensitive data in an Agency VM visible to the 
attacker [35]. It also provides the attacker with a mecha-
nism to move resources across TZs, for example by mov-
ing memory dumps, machine state, or entire VM instanc-
es from one physical machine to another. For example, 
the attacker could use the VMM to take a memory snap-
shot of an Agency VM in TZ Gold. The attacker could 
then proceed to access sensitive access tokens or data.  
This attack has three key steps: identifying the HV 
hosting the target, gaining access to the VMM control 
channel, and executing a snapshot or memory dump re-
quest from the VMM. 
One path for this attack begins from a compromised 
node or insider in the CSP enclave. This person, or node 
would allow the attacker to identify the HV that con-
tained the target VM. Identifying the HV implies identifi-
cation of the VMM. Other outsider attack paths also exist. 
Once the target VMM is identified, the attacker ac-
quires the ability to send it valid requests. If the physical 
machine has a separate network interface card (NIC) in-
stalled to isolate command channel traffic to the VMM, 
the attacker may need to compromise a CSP enclave 
node with access to that network. Or a CSP insider with 
access to a CSP management enclave C2 node can do this 
if the CSP insider has sys admin privileges.  
If VMM traffic transits the same NIC as all other traffic 
to and from the HV, an outside attacker may be able to 
gain access to and control the VMM from C2 nodes out-
side of the CSP management enclave. In order for this 
attack path to be successful the attacker will have to 
compromise one or more nodes in the cloud network that 
are in the network path between the target and the CSP 
management servers in the CSP TZ.   
If management function requests are run using a pro-
tocol that does not require authentication, network access 
to the control channel gained in the previous step might 
be the only requirement for successfully dumping the 
memory of the target VM. Otherwise, a credential may 
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need to be compromised. If this is the case, the insider or 
compromised node in the CSP enclave could be used to 
surveil the host and network for valid credentials. The 
attacker establishes a destination for the memory dump, 
presumably outside the Agency’s TZ.   
The attacker sends a message to the VMM managing 
the target VM instructing it to dump its memory into a 
location in TZ B. The attacker examines the memory 
dump and identifies needed credentials to access agency 
Gold data, or finds the Gold data directly in memory. 
Corrupting agency VM images 2 
VM images and instances are vulnerable to attacks from 
the time they are created, during their transfer to the 
CSP, in storage in the cloud, while running, and when 
they are migrated within the cloud. Any unauthorized 
access or manipulation of VM image file can undermine 
trust in it. Infecting images can be more damaging than 
‘stealing’ them because instances based on the infected 
image will continue to process sensitive data and may 
expose it to further exploitation. Integrity checks that are 
both stringent and regularly performed can provide 
some assurance regarding the health of the image, but 
such checks can be defeated. 
Modifying a startup script in a VM image provides a 
simple example of how an attacker can gain control of a 
VM. Adding just a few commands can open a backdoor 
(i.e., exploit a vulnerability in the OS) or send a beacon 
signal to the attacker’s command and control infrastruc-
ture. The attacker can then connect to the VM and con-
tinue to the next phases in the attack. Because the attack 
is inserted into the startup routine, it will run every time 
a VM instance based on infected image is spun up. VM 
instances are also susceptible to manipulation.  
Implementing this attack requires three steps: gaining 
access to the CCS, modifying images or instances while 
avoiding integrity check violations, and creating a beacon 
that indicates successful compromise of a live VM.  
Attacks that exploit vulnerabilities of networked de-
vices may also apply to CSP management servers. An 
APT could use spearfishing, surveillance, and installation 
of malware to gain access to a physical machine and sys-
admin account credentials in the CSP enclave providing 
them with a command and control (C2) node and net-
work access to cloud management servers in the cloud 
that host dormant VM images and instances.  
From the C2 node, the CSP enclave can be surveilled 
for the target: physical machines hosting the agency VM 
images and instances can be infected. Once found, the C2 
node can be used to access the target and establish the 
ability to read and write from the VM images and in-
stances. At this point a second APT package can be in-
jected into the agency VM image or instance.  The C2 
node can also be used to access and manipulate or defeat 
the aforementioned integrity checks by replacing hash 
values, or causing hash collisions. 
When an authorized agency user requests the VM im-
age or instance be spun up, integrity checks are circum-
vented and the modified startup scripts are run activat-
ing backdoor and beaconing malware. The activation of 
the beacon and backdoor can be scheduled to run at a 
later time or made to run so quickly such that the devia-
tion from a baseline startup time may not be noticeable.  
The attacker can use the backdoor on the infected VM 
to install additional malware if required. The attacker 
waits for a compromised VM to be started by an author-
ized user with TZ Gold credentials.  When this occurs the 
attacker has network access and elevated privileges on 
the target VM to access Agency Gold data.  
This attack can be defeated by encrypting Agency VM 
images stored in the CCS and ensuring cryptographic 
keys are controlled by the Agency and not the CSP. There 
are a number of ways of implementing a secure key 
managment system for CSPs. One approach has been 
developed by Tysowski, et. al. [46].  
Undetected configuration modification 
Restricting traffic to a single whitelisted IP address asso-
ciate with an agency enclave is a common baseline secu-
rity control-best practice for limiting access to resources 
provisioned in the cloud. This, in theory limits access to 
the cloud resources to traffic emanating from the agency 
enclave, but it does not extend all agency enclave protec-
tions and monitoring to agency resources in the cloud 
(for example, an IDS may be absent in the cloud, and the 
CSP SIEM may not receive data from firewalls protecting 
Agency TZs). Therefore, the agency has less situational 
awareness regarding activity on its cloud based resources 
than it does within its enclave. This may allow the at-
tacker to obtain access to sensitive data in the cloud. 
Typically the CSP will provide an implementation of 
this control to agency users. For example: defining secu-
rity groups for particular VMs. Permissions to create, 
modify and remove these configurations are granted to 
agency users with CSP accounts according to agency 
provisioning using the CSP’s IAM schema. For example: 
agency user A is allowed to create VMs and set security 
groups, agency user B is allowed to start and stop in-
stances but cannot create them or modify their configura-
tions. In order to modify the security group configuration 
and whitelist IP address corresponding to its C2 nodes, 
the attacker need only gain access to the CSP credentials 
for agency user A.  
Whitelisting an additional IP address for an APT C2 
node outside the agency’s enclave allows the attacker to 
user the credentials it has acquired from inside the agen-
cy’s enclave to access the agencies resources in the cloud 
without any of the agencies monitoring tools detecting 
the access. If the CSP does not notify the agency that a 
configuration change has been made, and the attacker 
restores the original configuration after the access is 
complete, the agency may never learn of the access. 
This attack has three steps: obtaining credentials for 
agency CSP resource configuration modifications and for 
agency A and G TZ access; modification of agency CSP 
resource configurations to white list the IP address of the 
attacker’s C2 node; and access of agency Gold data from 
the newly whitelisted enclave. 
The attack begins by compromising a node within the 
agency’s enclave via spear phishing or other methods. 
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This node allows the attacker to perform surveillance 
that subsequently yields a valid credential being used by 
agency users to access a resource on an agency VM in the 
gold TZ, as well as a valid credential for an agency user 
with the authority to modify configuration of agency CSP 
resources. 
Once the attacker has an agency user’s credential for 
modifying configurations it may be able to use this cre-
dential from nearly anywhere because this access may 
not confined to whitelisted IP addresses. Once it logs into 
the CSP management interface and adds an additional IP 
address to the agency’s Gold VM whitelist this task is 
complete. An additional step to cover its tracks after the 
attack is complete might involve reverting the configura-
tion to its original setting.  
Armed with the VM access credential obtained in the 
first step, and a network path from its C2 node outside 
the agency’s enclave, the attacker can proceed with es-
sentially unmonitored access to the agency’s VM using 
legitimate credentials.  
Nested virtualization 
A nested virtualization attack [36] uses an additional un-
authorized HV to access sensitive data and credentials. 
The additional HV could be inserted either between the 
normal HV and the physical hardware, or between a 
guest OS and the normal HV. In the former case, the ad-
ditional HV will provide an attack surface that spans all 
of the VMs on the original HV. In the later case, the addi-
tional HV could be confined to a specific guest OS.  
The target for the attack is a VM running in TZ G or is 
a VM image with stored TZ G credentials that is at rest. 
Finding the VM image at rest, or finding the physical 
machine that the target VM is or will be spun up would 
be accomplished by surveillance of Agency VM opera-
tions. Either target is likely to begin with the attacker 
gaining access to the CSP management enclave in order 
to perform sufficient surveillance. An insider working for 
the CSP can do the surveillance.   
Attacking the VM image and inserting the unauthor-
ized HV provides the advantage that the operation can 
be performed before the image is loaded into the CSP 
infrastructure (while it is still in the agency enclave). 
Targeting the image at rest, the attacker would ‘wrap’ 
it with an additional HV (which would boot up first). 
Targeting the physical machine would require that the 
attacker either be able to reboot the machine and cause it 
to load the attacker’s HV first, and then load the CSP’s 
HV, or implement a ‘blue pill’ rerouting of a live HV 
without rebooting [36].  
Once an attacker has successfully nested a HV at either 
layer, one of the main advantages, in addition to gaining 
access to memory and other sensitive resources, is that 
the rest of the stack would function ‘normally’. The guest 
VMs continue to run on virtualized infrastructure, and 
the original HV thinks it is running on CSP hardware. 
Once the attacker has succeeded in injecting a HV that 
it controls, it has gained a stealthy point of access to sen-
sitive VM data and credentials. However, unless the at-
tack is completely autonomous, it may require additional 
surveillance and C2 activities. The HV may therefore 
have to beacon to another node to complete the attack. 
Nested virtualization attacks exploit the fact that both 
the intended hosts and guests might not have mecha-
nisms available to verify the other parties. The guests are 
supposed to run on a virtualized platform and may not 
be able to detect that they are not running directly on a 
CSP sanctioned HV. Similarly, both the CSP HV and the 
CSP hardware provide interfaces that do not discrimi-
nate between consumers of their resources. Absent spe-
cific restrictions, an additional attacker controlled HV 
could be a consumer that is as accepted as a guest OS, or 
CSP controlled HV. 
6 BAYESIAN NETWORK MODEL 
We apply Bayesian network statistics to the attack paths 
described above. Attack paths have been used to under-
stand the vulnerability status of information systems 
[37]. They have also been used to develop probabilistic 
measures of enterprise network security [38] [39]. We 
extend this approach to CCSs by constructing an acyclic 
directed graph using the attack paths defined above [40].  
We apply these attack paths to the CCS node classes de-
fined in Fig. 3. The resulting directed graph is shown in 
Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5: IaaS CCS Infiltration Bayesian Sub-Network 
Cloud-Trust relies on conditional probabilities that 
represent the probability that a vulnerability in an indi-
vidual CCS component can be exploited by an APT, if 
other CCS components have already been compromised. 
These conditional probabilities correspond to the di-
rected edges shown in Fig. 5. This approach enables us to 
factor in the contributions that specific CCS security fea-
tures can have in reducing the vulnerabilities of nodes in 
the CCS and which then can contribute to a reduction in 
the overall security profile of an IaaS cloud.  Our model 
of CCS architectures includes the security features and 
controls the CSP provides, what the CSP permits the cus-
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tomer or cloud tenant to provide, and what the cloud 
tenant actually provides. 
The complete security model consists of two Bayesian 
sub-networks: an infiltration sub-network and an exfil-
tration sub-network.  Only the Cloud-Trust infiltration 
sub-network is shown in Fig. 5. The infiltration sub-
network characterizes the probability that an APT will be 
able to access the gold data, while the exfiltration net-
work characterizes the likelihood that the APT can exfil-
trate the accessed gold data. We assume the two sub-
networks are independent, i.e., the infiltration strategy is 
independent of the exfiltration strategy employed by the 
attacker (In a subsequent paper we will examine the rela-
tionships of infiltration and exfiltration strategies and 
will extend Cloud-Trust to exfiltration networks).  
We denote the infiltration Bayesian network 𝐵!" =𝐺!",Θ!" , where 𝐺!" is a directed acyclic graph with 
nodes that are random variables and links that are direct 
dependencies between those random variables. Let 𝑉!" = 𝐴! !!!!  be the sequence of random variables repre-
senting the nodes of 𝑉!" such that binary random varia-
ble 𝐴! denotes whether node 𝑖 ∈ 1,… , 𝑛  has been ac-
cessed by an APT to infiltrate the gold data.  Further-
more, defining 𝑎!" = Pr 𝐴! 𝐴!  as the probability that 
node 𝑖 is accessed by the APT given that node  𝑗 is ac-
cessed by the APT, we can define the link set as 𝐿!" = 𝑖, 𝑗 : 𝑎!" > 0, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝑛 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 . Observe that the 
link set 𝐿!" gives the nodes between which an APT can 
traverse with positive probability.  Since 𝐺!" is a directed 
graph, we must have that 𝑎!" ≠ 𝑎!". A consequence of the 
acyclic property is that either 𝑎!" = 0 or 𝑎!" = 0. The com-
ponent Θ!" represents the set of quantitative parameters 
in the network; for each parameter 𝜃! ∈ Θ!"for 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛, 
we have that 𝜃! = Pr  (𝐴!|𝜋!), where 𝜋! = 𝐴!: 𝑎!" > 0 . In 
other words, the set 𝜋! is the set of parents of node 𝑖 or 
the set of nodes from which an APT can access node 𝑖 
with positive probability. Note that we will make the 
Markov assumption that the random variable 𝐴!depends 
only on its parents 𝜋!, i.e., the access of a node 𝑖 depends 
only on which node 𝑗 it was accessed by the APT and not 
the history of how the APT accessed node 𝑗.  
While the above exposition characterizes the (unop-
posed) attack carried out by the APT, the SIEM has an 
opportunity to detect the APT’s attack.  Hence, we define 
the binary random variable 𝐷!!" indicating whether the 
SIEM detects an APT access of node class 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛 indi-
cating whether the SIEM detects an APT exfiltrating data 
through node class 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛.  If we let 𝐴 denote the 
event that the gold data has been accessed by the APT 
and undetected by the SIEM, we can calculate the proba-
bility of undetected access as  
  Pr(𝐴) = 1 − 1 − Pr  (𝐴|𝐴!)×Pr  (𝐴!)×[1 − Pr 𝐷!!" ]!!!!  
 
where the probability that node class 𝑖 has been accessed 
is given by 
 
Pr 𝐴! = 1 − 1 − Pr 𝐴! 𝐴! Pr 𝐴!!!!!,!!!= 1 − 1 − 𝑎!"× Pr 𝐴!!!!!,!!!  
 
for 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛.  We assume that Pr 𝐴! = 1, i.e., the APT 
accessing the enclave node class is taken as given.  
Hence, we have a system of n equations and n un-
knowns, i.e., Pr 𝐴! ,… , Pr 𝐴! , Pr  (𝐴).  Since the Bayesian 
network is acyclic, solving this system is algebraically 
simple using substitution.   
Our model can also estimate the probability that 
the SIEM and associated IS3 systems will detect an attack 
that would infiltrate the gold data.  Let 𝐷!" be a binary 
random variable indicating whether the SIEM detect an 
attack that would infiltrate the gold data.  Then 
 Pr 𝐷!" = Pr 𝐴 𝑛𝑜  𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − Pr  (𝐴)Pr  (𝐴)  
 
where Pr  (𝐴|𝑛𝑜  𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) is the probability that the APT 
can infiltrate the gold data without any detection (i.e., Pr 𝐷!!" = 0   for 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛.  The above equation shows 
what percentage of attacks that would otherwise be suc-
cessful in infiltrating the gold data can be detected. 
Although mathematically simple, our Bayesian net-
work approach imposes constraints on how APT attacks 
can be represented. We have assumed the Markov prop-
erty when defining the conditional probabilities. In some 
attacks it may be necessary to return to previously com-
promised nodes to proceed with the attack.  In our math-
ematical formalism this type of circular path is forbidden. 
We account for such a possibility and for the possibility 
that an attacker may have to traverse the ingress path 
more than once, by including a probability of APT “bea-
con success” at nodes where additional attack software 
code or APT commands are needed. This eliminates cy-
cles in the infiltration attack graph.  
In general, it is possible to expand the node set to allow 
for attack path histories to influence the probability of 
node access; however, the tractability and insight that 
could be gleaned from the model output might be ham-
pered.  Using a similar approach, we could also remove 
the assumption that the infiltration and exfiltration pro-
cesses are independent, but it’s not clear that such com-
plexity would add value to the model.  
7    ILLUSTRATIVE CLOUD-TRUST RESULTS 
To apply the model conditional probabilities are needed 
for all network edges – the probability that given the 
APT has access to the starting node of the edge, the APT 
will be able to exploit a vulnerability, conduct surveil-
lance and identify, or obtain co-residency with the target 
node at the end of the edge. Over 50 probability scores 
are needed to fully characterize the Cloud-Trust infiltra-
tion Bayesian network for a typical cloud architecture. 
For the illustrative cloud architecture assessments pre-
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sented in this paper over 400 probability score inputs 
were estimated using a variety of methods. Below we 
describe how some of these estimates were made.  
The scope of Cloud-Trust does not include the security 
measures used in external network enclaves. So we as-
sume that an APT can gain access to relevant external 
network enclaves and to cloud credentials stored there.  
For some attack paths the attacker obtains initial cloud 
TZ credentials by legitimate means. This is the initial step 
of the VM side channel attack. In this case the attacker 
has a legitimate public cloud account that enables him to 
instantiate a VM in the public cloud in TZ B. The second 
step in this attack is to move from a VM in TZ B to be co-
resident with the target VM in TZ Gold. As described 
earlier in the attack narrative there are various mecha-
nisms that can be used in public clouds to conduct sur-
veillance and to move a VM into a preferential location in 
the cloud so the attacker becomes co-resident with the 
target. We assess the success of these methods for specific 
cloud architectures using two probability scores p_s and 
p_cr. The value of these probabilities estimates, shown in 
Table 3, are derived from the literature that applies to 
different public cloud offerings [5].[14][13]. 
We do not estimate the probability that a specific HV 
will have exploitable vulnerabilities. Instead, we consider 
a generic HV. HVs are large code bases that resemble OS 
kernels, so we assume the probability is high that an un-
signed HV contains vulnerabilities. On the other hand, if 
the HV is signed and trusted boot time measurements 
are available from the manufacturer we reduce this prob-
ability significantly as indicated in the table (in other 
words we assume the HV still has vulnerabilities, but 
during a reboot they will be detected and a “pristine” 
version of the HV can be re-installed from a Gold Disk.  
Table 3 
Selected Cloud-Trust Probability Scores 
 
The discussion above illustrates the types of probabili-
ties used in our approach: one, probabilities which repre-
sent the likelihood that a particular type of activity can be 
accomplished in the cloud (that is whether cloud security 
controls are present or absent which would constrain or 
eliminate the activity); two, probabilities that reflect the 
likelihood the attacker can gain access to one or more 
cloud resources (e.g., whether IAM controls are in place 
to restrict attacker access); and three, the probability that 
a specific type of cloud component contains a vulnerabil-
ity or property which can be exploited by the attacker to 
maneuver to or gain access to another cloud component.  
In many cases such probabilities cannot be determined 
precisely by analytical means. For example, all vulnera-
bilities that are present in a HV may not be known. In 
cases were there is significant uncertainty in a vulnerabil-
ity value, we assign one of five values to the conditional 
probability:  very high (set equal to 1), high (set equal to 
.9), medium (set equal to one half), low (set equal to .1), 
and very low (.01).  We estimate probabilities of APT 
detection for each node class in the cloud architecture 
using a similar approach. There is also uncertainty re-
garding specific conditional detection probabilities. In 
these cases we also estimate the probabilities of detection 
on a five level scale. Based on reports available in the 
open press on the extent and longevity of APT attacks we 
do not ascribe high detection probabilities to most edges 
in the Bayesian network [41][28][42].  
An alternative means to determine conditional attack 
probabilities is to use the common vulnerability scoring 
system (CVSS) [43]. CVSS scores associated with specific 
CCS components could be used to estimate these condi-
tional probabilities. Such an approach would resemble 
that suggested by earlier authors [38]. 
Table 4 
Cloud-Trust Assessment Results 
 
Illustrative Cloud-Trust results are shown in Table 4 
for the cloud architectures defined in Table 1. The cloud 
architectures with more capable security controls are es-
timated to have lower probability of successful APT infil-
tration. Not surprisingly, if the APT is detected prior to 
gold data access, the probability of infiltration is reduced. 
This effect is most pronounced in cloud architectures 3 
and 4, which have more robust security controls. How-
ever, one can see that even with robust security controls, 
the estimated probability of APT or threat detection are 
less than or equal to 1/2 in all cases. The estimated cu-
mulative APT detection probability is ~ 1/2 in architec-
tures 3 and 4 because the individual APT detection prob-
abilities for individual CCS components are estimated to 
be small (with the exception of file access monitoring of 
the Agency Gold data store in TZ G) and because file 
access monitoring may not provide an effective APT de-
tection capability if the APT accesses TZ Gold using valid 
stolen credentials.  Cloud-Trust accounts for this possibil-
ity in the overall assessments scores given above.  
Cloud architecture 4 has the lowest probability of APT 
infiltration. This architecture makes extensive use of en-
cryption to protect VM images at rest and live VMs dur-
ing migration. It also uses a signed HV, and robust sys-
admin access control methods to verify the identity of 
both CSP sys-admins and Agency cloud users. These 
security controls make it more difficult for the APT to 
steal valid credentials and obtain a long lasting presence 
in key CCS components, such as the HV. If the HV or 
BIOS are modified by the APT, there is a good chance the 
HV modification will be detected (especially if the APT is 
 Attack Step  Cloud 
Arch 1  
Cloud 
Arch 2 
Cloud 
Arch 3  
Cloud 
Arch 4  
1 TZ B Access from Tenant 
B enclave 
1 1 1 1 
2a Establish co-residency – 
surveillance (p_s) 
1  1 1 .1 
2b Establish co-residency – 
VM movement (p_cr) 
0.5  0.5  0.5  .01  
3 Obtain credentials 
(varies by attack) 
0.1 0.1 0.01 ..01 
 
4 Exploitable hypervisor 
vulnerability 
0.9 0.9 0.9 .01 
 
Cloud  
Architecture 
Infiltration 
Probability with 
APT Detection 
Infiltration 
Probability without 
APT Detection 
Detection 
Probability (APT 
accesses gold data) 
1 0.89 0.99 0.1 
2 0.84 0.98 0.14 
3 0.25 0.46 0.46 
4 0.004 0.007 0.5 
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a complex and large code base), even if the APT itself can 
not be detected. The compromised HV or BIOS can then 
be deleted, and a “pristine” version of the HV can be re-
installed from a Gold Disk. 
7 CONCLUSION 
We have demonstrated how Cloud-Trust can be used to 
assess the security status of IaaS CCSs and IaaS CSP ser-
vice offerings, and how it is used to compute probabili-
ties of APT infiltration (high value data access) and prob-
abilities of APT detection. These quantify two key securi-
ty metrics: IaaS CCS confidentiality and integrity. Cloud-
Trust also produces quantitative assessments of the value 
and contribution of specific CCS security controls (in-
cluding several optional security controls now offered by 
leading commercial CSPs), and can be used to conduct 
sensitivity analyses of the incremental value of adding 
specific security controls to an IaaS CCS, when there is 
uncertainty regarding the value of a specific security con-
trol (which may be optional and increase the cost of CSP 
services).   
Potential next steps 
The scope of initial version of Cloud-Trust is limited to 
IaaS CCSs and CSPs. It also does not include all possible 
insider attacks. Potential next steps should be to extend 
Cloud-Trust to include the full range of insider attacks, 
and to Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a 
Service (SaaS) CSPs.  
It would also be useful to develop a full set of data ex-
filtration APT attack steps that span the component space 
of CCSs and CSPs. It would also be to explore how CVSS 
data could be used to estimate APT attack probabilities. 
A robust sensitivity analysis methodology could also be 
developed to see which nodes and edges Cloud-Trust 
results are most sensitive to. 
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